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ADVOCACY AND ATTRIBUTION:  SHAPING AND RESPONDING 
TO PERCEPTIONS OF THE CAUSES OF HOMELESSNESS 
GARY BLASI* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Organizing people to collective action requires, among many other things, 
altering their understandings of their own circumstances and the alternatives.  
Advocacy requires, among many other things, changing how more powerful 
people understand the circumstances of the less powerful.  In both instances, a 
crucial aspect of understanding itself is the perception of the causes of 
behavior and of social facts—what psychologists call “social attribution.”1  If 
we come upon a well-dressed woman pushing a shopping cart down the 
sidewalk near a supermarket, we attribute her behavior to the desire to get her 
groceries to her car for the trip home.  If we come upon disheveled woman 
pushing the same shopping cart down the same sidewalk, we may attribute her 
behavior to her homelessness.  We understand both individual behavior and 
social problems in terms of causal attributions, and we often use very limited 
information to make complex causal judgments. 
Consider Kim, an apparently homeless person pushing a shopping cart full 
of plastic bags down the sidewalk near a supermarket in Los Angeles.  Neither 
you nor I know anything about Kim and what has happened in the 40-odd 
years of Kim’s life before this day.  But both of us already have causal 
theories, both about Kim and about homelessness in general.  What we think 
should be done with regard to Kim, and about homelessness more generally, 
largely depends on the content of those causal attributions.  If we believe 
Kim’s situation is the consequence of bad choices and individual deficits, we 
 
* Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles School of Law.  Earlier versions of 
this paper were presented at the International Conference on Public Spaces and Socio-Spatial 
Exclusion, Sno Paulo, Brazil, November 1998, and at a conference and meeting of the ABA 
Commission on Homelessness & Poverty at St. Louis University in March 2000.  I am grateful to 
the participants in both conferences for helpful criticisms.  Thanks also to Florence Roisman for 
correcting some glaring historical errors in an earlier version.  Dave Lin provided exceptional 
research assistance and many useful ideas in conversation.  All the remaining errors are, of 
course, mine alone. 
 1. Michael W. Morris et al., Attribution Theory, in THE MIT ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
COGNITIVE SCIENCES 45 (Robert A. Wilson & Frank C. Keil eds., 1999). 
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come to one set of feelings.  If we believe Kim’s homelessness is the product 
of the failings of our institutions or the fundamental structure of society, we 
have an entirely different reaction. Our attributional beliefs are also affected by 
whether we believe Kim is, in fact, homeless or merely very poor.  And, for 
reasons I will explain in this essay, our belief about what has caused Kim to be 
pushing a shopping cart down the sidewalk on this day is also likely to be 
affected by what we imagine to be Kim’s gender and race. 
By now, few careful people would argue that there is a single cause of 
homelessness, either as a social phenomenon or as the circumstance of one 
individual.2  I will not here engage the various social science literatures that 
touch on the various causes of homelessness.3  For this essay is not about the 
causes of homelessness, but rather about beliefs about those causes, and about 
how advocacy is shaped by, and also sometimes shapes, such beliefs.  The 
general topic of how people understand the causes of the behavior and 
circumstances of others occupies an entire field within social psychology—
social attribution theory—that has been too long ignored by advocates.4  I 
introduce a bit of this literature here, on the way to considering its applications 
for practicing advocates. 
I take as a point of departure what seems to me a quite surprising finding 
of many polls, surveys, and experiments: While most people blame poverty on 
the poor, most people blame homelessness on society.5  This is especially 
surprising, given the obviously close connections between homelessness and 
poverty and given the general disposition of the dominant Western culture to 
ascribe unpleasant personal circumstances to personal deficits.6  In the course 
of exploring the reasons for the difference in attributing the causes of poverty 
and of homelessness, I want to suggest four things about social advocacy.  
First, effective advocacy, whether conducted in an individual courtroom or a 
national media campaign, always pays close attention to the attributional 
beliefs of those who matter to decisions.  Second, although advocates operate 
in a world of preexisting beliefs about social causation that are part of the 
general culture, advocacy can sometimes re-shape widely-held attributional 
 
 2. Paul Koegel, M. Audrey Burnam & Jim Baumohl, The Causes of Homelessness, in 
HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA 24-33 (James Baumohl ed., 1995) (arguing for an “integrated” 
perspective that takes account both of individual variation and social context). 
 3. I have written briefly elsewhere about the pragmatist’s need to situate such inquiries in 
the context of what might be done about homelessness.  Gary Blasi, What’s A Theory For?: Notes 
On Reconstructing Poverty Law Scholarship, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1063 (1994). 
 4. Good introductory texts include ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF 
PEOPLE (1999); SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION (2d ed. 1991). 
 5. See Section IIIA below for a summary of the evidence on this point. 
 6. As noted below, this tendency is so strong that it came to be described as the 
“Fundamental Attribution Error,” thought to be a pervasive feature of human cognition—until 
cross-cultural and developmental studies demonstrated that it is a learned feature of the culture. 
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beliefs.  Indeed, I will argue that one plausible explanation for the attributional 
differences between poverty and homelessness lies in the work of advocates, 
particularly in the media, during the period in which the very concept of 
“homelessness” entered common public discourse in the United States.  Third, 
while courtroom lawyers and skilled policy advocates may intuitively 
understand the significance and shaping of causal beliefs about problems, there 
is now a large body of scientific knowledge on this subject also worth 
considering, for an important reason: our intuitions are sometimes simply 
wrong.  Finally, recent work in the cognitive science of causal beliefs suggests 
that advocates must deal with a world of beliefs about social problems that are 
not merely sometimes incorrect, but also inherently irrational and even entirely 
subconscious.  In particular, I will suggest that another plausible explanation 
for the differences in attribution of the causes of homelessness and poverty 
relates to often purely implicit connections to race and stereotyped beliefs 
about African Americans. 
II. CAUSATION AND THE ROLE OF ADVOCACY 
As both experienced advocates and social theorists know, causation 
matters.  First, causation determines whether blame attaches—to anyone—and 
whether some remedy should therefore follow.  A trial lawyer’s first job is to 
prove that the damages sustained by the plaintiff were caused by someone else 
and were not the consequence of—in the ancient phrase—an “Act of God.”7  
Without causation there is no blame and hence no plaintiff’s verdict—even if 
the defendant happens to be ecstatic at the plaintiff’s misfortune.  In the realm 
of social problems as well, causation is crucial in determining what areas we 
regard as suitable for intervention, and which interventions we will come to 
support.8  The social advocate’s first job is to prove that the conditions that 
concern us are not in the natural order of things, but have been caused, and are 
therefore subject to change—by altering the cause.  As Murray Edelman has 
written, “[p]overty, unemployment, and discrimination against minorities and 
women are accepted as problems today, but through much of human history 
they were regarded as part of the natural order. . . .”9  Similarly, lung cancer 
was once thought inexplicable; but once we discovered that tobacco smoke 
causes lung cancer, then lung cancer became a social problem—a situation 
“caused by human actions and amenable to human intervention.”10 
 
 7. “The earliest use of the expression “act of God” in law books is by Lord Coke who 
applied it to death, sudden tempest, and the like. Lord Mansfield later introduced the idea which 
has been at the basis of the modern conception of the term—namely, that an act of God is one 
which could not happen by human intervention.”  1 AM. JUR. 2d Act of God § 1 (1994). 
 8. Deborah A. Stone, Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas, 104 POL. SCI. 
Q. 281 (1989). 
 9. MURRAY EDELMAN, CONSTRUCTING THE POLITICAL SPECTACLE 12 (1988). 
 10. Id. 
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A. Advocating for a Cause 
Thus, for both individual cases and social controversies, the existence of 
perceived causation amenable to action is a predicate to further advocacy.  But 
it is merely a predicate: necessary but not sufficient.  Most advocacy focuses 
on which cause is chiefly to blame.  The trial lawyer’s job is not merely to 
prove that the plaintiff’s damages were caused by someone, but that they were 
caused by the defendant.  The policy advocate’s burden is to show that, among 
all the possible causes of a social problem, one cause is especially significant 
and will be altered by a given policy change.  According to the “story model” 
of juror decision-making of Pennington and Hastie, jurors reach decisions by 
imposing “a narrative story organization on trial information, in which causal 
and intentional relations between events are central.”11  Judicial decisions, such 
as sentencing decisions, can be understood in the same terms.12  The job of the 
trial lawyer is thus to present the causal story that is most coherent with the 
evidence.  A policy advocate may see her objective in the same terms: to 
provide to decision-makers and the general public a narrative about the 
problem that foregrounds a particular cause, and thereby a particular potential 
change in policy. 
Both trial lawyers and policy advocates work in a world of often deeply 
held, if entirely false, opinions about social causation.  Every experienced trial 
lawyer knows that jurors come to cases with prejudices and preconceptions—
certain default assumptions about how people behave and why.  One purpose 
of voir dire is to explore the causal theories that jurors have brought with them 
to the courtroom.  Moreover, trial lawyers generally have some idea of what 
causal theories will be advanced by the litigants in the course of a trial.  In the 
typical two-party case, there are only two basic contending narratives.  For 
example, either O.J. Simpson caused the deaths of his ex-wife and her friend 
and was arrested because he was guilty, or their deaths were caused by 
someone else and Simpson was framed by overzealous or racist police officers 
(who may or may not have believed him guilty).13  Which of those stories 
seems most plausible depends, of course, on preexisting beliefs about many 
things, including the probably behavior of police officers toward African 
 
 11. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for 
the Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 189 (1992). 
 12. ARTHUR J. LURIGIO ET AL., Understanding Judges’ Sentencing Decisions: Attributions 
of Responsibility and Story Construction 91 (Linda Heath et al., eds., 1994). 
 13. In most cases, the causal stories are seen as mutually exclusive: few people seem able to 
grasp the possibility that the police might plant evidence implicating a guilty man.  The very 
notion of “framing” is associated with the innocence of the framed.  That concept seems, 
somehow, to fit less well a scenario in which police officers, concerned that a person they believe 
guilty may escape justice, plant additional evidence. 
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American men.14  In the constrained arena of a trial, the lawyer’s function is to 
introduce and explain evidence in terms of a causal theory that will, in 
interaction with the preexisting beliefs of the jury, lead to a particular belief 
about causation in the minds of the jury. 
In contests over public policies and social problems, advocates have a 
similar function: altering public perceptions of the causes of problems by either 
injecting new causal stories or emphasizing particular causal stories in the pre-
existing public discourse. In the social arena, there are often many contending 
causal stories, not just the two found in most trials.  Sometimes, it seems that 
there are as many causal stories as there are interests that might be affected by 
the problematic situation.  In the early years of my work on issues of 
homelessness in Los Angeles, I was invited at various times to speak to groups 
of psychiatrists, building industry leaders, urban planners, welfare bureaucrats, 
nonprofit housing developers, religious missions, labor unions, and even one 
group that carried on the beliefs of Henry George about the need for a single 
tax on land.15  Each of these groups had a pretty clear set of beliefs about the 
causes of homelessness in Los Angeles.  Their causal theories were, of course, 
all entirely different.  And to some extent at least, they were all true, or at least 
plausible (though I remain agnostic about Henry George).  One noticed, 
however, that the most salient perceived cause of homelessness always had 
something to do with the issues that already concerned the group: psychiatrists 
saw mainly issues of how society responds to mental disorders; developers 
blamed a shortage of housing caused by excessive land-use regulation, and so 
on.  We can ascertain the dominant causal theories of various groups by 
interacting, as I did, with many different kinds of people and groups.  And, 
although policy advocates cannot conduct a voir dire of their “jury”—the 
general public or a subset of decision-makers—they sometimes have a 
 
 14. Thus, my colleague Peter Arenella, who was employed by ABC News and others to 
watch the Simpson trial closely, accounted for the verdict partly in these terms: 
Everybody interprets information from their own point of view and their perspective 
reflects in part their sense of how the world works. Race, gender, and class help to define 
a person’s story of how the world works because these three factors generate so many of 
one’s social experiences. Jurors rely on these stories in interpreting evidence at a criminal 
trial. Numerous studies point out that “each juror, using her own life experiences, 
organizes the information she receives about a case into what for her is the most plausible 
account of what happened and then picks the verdict that fits that story best. Jurors may 
interpret the same evidence differently depending on which stories they choose.”  [citing 
Nancy J. King, Postcoviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of 
Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63, 78 (1993).] 
Peter Arenella, Explaining The Unexplainable: Analyzing The Simpson Verdict, 26 N.M. L. REV. 
349, 355 (1996). 
 15. HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY 427 (1937). George’s ideas are kept in 
circulation by very 21st century means.  See Henry George, Taxes: What are They Good For?, at 
http://www.henrygeorge.org (visited Mar. 2, 2001). 
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functional equivalent: the data gathered from samples of people in surveys or 
focus groups.  Sometimes advocacy resources might be well spent on such 
inquiries into preexisting causal belief. 
B. Ideology and Attributional Belief 
Although there are often many different contending causal theories for a 
social problem like homelessness, virtually all causal theories tend to cluster 
around one of two kinds of explanation: those that emphasize individual-level 
characteristics and those that emphasize social and structural conditions.  And 
on this score, most people come to the question with powerful predispositions.  
Among the early of systematic studies of how people understand the causes of 
human behavior, one robust finding was this: observers tended nearly always 
to overestimate how much behavior is determined by the characteristics of the 
person, compared to the situational context in which the person acted.  For 
example, if I have one encounter with a judge who snaps at me in oral 
argument, I am unduly likely to assume that this behavior reflects some stable 
internal disposition of the judge, and to pay less attention to what may have 
been the frustrating circumstances that gave rise to the anger.  So persistent 
was this error, in experiment after experiment, that social psychologists 
denoted this the Fundamental Attribution Error, or FAE, and assumed it was a 
standard feature of human cognition.16 
Further cross-cultural research suggested that the Fundamental Attribution 
Error might not be so fundamental after all.  It appears to operate with 
particular force in the United States and other individualist Western cultures, 
as compared to other, less individualistic, cultures like China.17  In Western 
cultures, however, the FAE seems to operate with regard to all kinds of 
perceived behavior and circumstances.  If we add to the FAE the effects of the 
(perhaps not unrelated) dominant ideology in the U.S. concerning the causes of 
poverty,18 then we should expect a very strong disposition among Americans 
(in particular) to attribute poverty to individual failings. 
In the case of homelessness, as with poverty, ideologues and advocates of 
both right and left have long recognized the policy implications of the 
structural/individualist causal dichotomy.  If homelessness (or poverty, or 
 
 16. Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the 
Attribution Process, in 10 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 174-221 (L. 
Berkowitz ed., 1977).  See generally SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL 
COGNITION 67-72 (2d ed. 1991). 
 17. Michael W. Morris & Kaiping Peng, Culture and Cause: American and Chinese 
Attributions for Social and Physical Events, 67 J. PERSONALITY. SOC. PSYCHOL, 949-971 (1994). 
See generally G.J.O. Fletcher & C. Ward, Attribution Theory and Processes: A Cross-cultural 
Perspective, in THE CROSS CULTURAL CHALLENGE TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (M.H. Bond ed., 
1988). 
 18. See, e.g., WILLIAM RYAN, BLAMING THE VICTIM 6-7 (1976). 
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crime, or other unpleasant situations) are the result of individual deficit, moral 
failing, poor personal choices and the like, then these are merely disquieting 
phenomena to be managed and controlled by the police.  On the other hand, if 
homelessness is related to social or economic policies, then those policies 
come into question.  Such questions, in turn, may implicate the distribution of 
wealth and power in society, with consequences not only for the poor and 
homeless, but also for the wealthy and well-housed—for all those in a position 
to shape policy and public opinion.  In the case of simple poverty, the outcome 
of this struggle over blame is reasonably well-settled: Although there are 
variations among countries, cultures, social classes, races, genders, and those 
with differing educational backgrounds, the dominant popular view is that 
poverty is caused by the poor—especially their disinclination to work.19 
III. DATA ON ATTRIBUTIONAL BELIEFS ABOUT HOMELESSNESS 
Attitudes toward “the homeless” are more complex.  As between the 
homeless and the poor, people feel both more social distance from, and more 
sympathy for, the homeless.20  People are, or example, far more willing to see 
public funds go toward ameliorating homelessness than poverty and many 
other social problems.21  These attitudes are related in complex ways to one 
other belief: By roughly the same proportions (as high as 2 to 1), people tend 
to blame poverty on the poor but homelessness on society.  Because these data 
are both surprising and important to the remainder of this essay, I provide 
some of the detailed findings of several different studies in this section. 
A. The Data 
Reporting on a survey of residents of Nashville, Tennessee, Lee et al. 
noted that “[c]ompared to their views on generic poverty, members of the 
public seem more willing to blame homelessness on external factors than 
 
 19. The literature on these topics is summarized briefly in Anup K. Singh, Attribution 
Research on Poverty: A Review, 32 PSYCHOLOGIA 143 (1989).  There is a good deal of cross-
cultural and other empirical work on the issue as well.  See, e.g., Goktug Morcol, Lay 
Explanations for Poverty in Turkey and their Determinants, 137 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 728 (1997); 
Shanto Iyengar, Framing Responsibility for Political Issues: The Case of Poverty, 12 POL. 
BEHAV. 1 (1990); Serge Guimond & Douglas Palmer, Type of Academic Training and Casual 
Attributions for Social Problems, 20 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 61 (1990); Stuart C. Carr & Malcolm 
MacLachlan, Actors, Observers, and Attributions for Third World Poverty: Contrasting 
Perspectives from Malawi and Australia, 139 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 189 (1998). 
 20. Robert J. Pellegrini et al., Political Identification and Perceptions of Homelessness: 
Attributed Causality and Attitudes on Public Policy, 80 PSYCHOL. REP. 1139 (1997). 
 21. Bruce G. Link et al., Public Knowledge, Attitudes, and Beliefs About Homeless People: 
Evidence for Compassion Fatigue, 23 AM. J. COMM. PSYCHOL. 533, 542 (1995). 
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individualistic ones.”22  They found that almost three-fifths of respondents 
attributed homelessness to structural forces, while less than two-fifths thought 
homelessness resulted from personal choice.23  Their data was consistent with 
reports from a national sample survey conducted in 1988 by Media General, 
which found that among those with opinions, 58% blamed society for 
homelessness, compared to 42% who blamed the homeless themselves.24 
Notably, the 1988 national survey had forced respondents to choose 
between social and individualist explanations.  In their local survey in 
Nashville, Lee et al. used a 40-question instrument to probe at a range of 
beliefs.  Only 10% of the sample selected a single cause; the remaining 90% 
reported 51 different combinations of multiple causes.25  Nevertheless, when 
subjected to factor analytic techniques, the greatest number of respondents 
attributed homelessness to a variety of  “structural forces.”26  The data from 
Nashville was consistent with that from a similar study in Erie County, New 
York, done at about the same time by Toro and McConnell.27  Using the same 
questions as had been used in the Media General survey, Toro and McConnell 
found that respondents blamed society rather than the homeless themselves by 
an even wider margin (65.6% to 34.4%) than in the national sample.28  Another 
local study, this time of undergraduates at San Jose State University in 
California, found similar emphasis on structural attributions when the question 
was presented in dichotomous form.  Also in 1992, the Gallup Organization 
reported in a national survey that large majorities of respondents identified as 
factors contributing to homelessness the following: unemployment (78%), job 
loss (67%), lack of affordable housing (55%), while most believed mental 
illness and laziness were not the causes of homelessness.29 
Finally, in a provocative and very useful study, George Wilson surveyed 
causal beliefs among adults in Baltimore, Maryland, in order to compare 
beliefs about three forms of what Wilson termed “extreme socioeconomic 
failure”: welfare dependency, homelessness, and migrant labor.30  He found 
that respondents were much more inclined to attribute welfare dependency 
 
 22. Barrett A. Lee et al., Public Beliefs About the Causes of Homelessness, 69 SOC. FORCES 
253, 262 (1990). 
 23. Id. at 257. 
 24. Id. at 262. 
 25. Id. at 257. 
 26. Id. at 262. 
 27. Paul A. Toro & Dennis M. McDonell, Beliefs, Attitudes, and Knowledge About 
Homelessness: A Survey of the General Public, 20 AM. J. COMM. PSYCHOL. 53, 60 n.1 (1992). 
 28. Id. at 61. 
 29. GALLUP ORGANIZATION, HOMELESS BUT NOT HELPLESS: A LOS ANGELES MISSION 
REPORT ON WHAT AMERICANS BELIEVE ABOUT HOMELESS PEOPLE, THEIR PROBLEMS, AND 
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS, at http://www.iugm.org/statistics/homerpt1.html (Feb. 10, 2000). 
 30. George Wilson, Toward a Revised Framework for Examining Beliefs About the Causes 
of Poverty, 37 SOC. Q. 413 (1996). 
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than homelessness to “lifestyle choice” (70.4% vs. 44.9%), and in general 
preferred structural explanations for homelessness but individualist 
explanations for welfare dependency, with migrant labor status occupying a 
middle ground.31  Wilson did not force respondents to a dichotomous choice, 
but offered instead a menu of 8 nonexclusive causal possibilities. 
All of these survey data are, of course, summary statistics reflecting 
averages among often quite disparate subgroups of respondents.  There are 
considerable differences among respondents of differing political beliefs, 
academic training, gender, and so on.  Conservatives prefer individualist 
explanations of homelessness, whether in California32 or Great Britain.33  
Students trained in social sciences are more likely to prefer structural 
accounts.34  American women are more likely than American men to credit 
structural accounts of homelessness.  For example, in a national survey study, 
Lee et al. found that, while men preferred structural explanations by barely a 
percentage point (39.3% to 38.1%), almost twice as many women attributed 
homelessness to structural factors  (50.3% to 27.9%).35  Toro and McDonnell 
found the same gender gap in their Erie County, New York study.36  And, of 
course, these factors can interact.  Sixty nine per cent  (69%) of Republican 
men locate the causes of homelessness in individual homeless people, 
compared to thirty two per cent (32%) of Democratic women.37  Thus, reports 
on “average” attributions of cause should be understood as masking significant 
variations among various demographic and political groups within the broad 
class of respondents. 
Attitudes toward the homeless are complex and go well beyond beliefs 
about causation.  Although the surveys mentioned above have suggested that 
people view “the homeless” more favorably than “the poor,” things are a bit 
more complicated than that.  Phelan et al. conducted a “vignette” study with a 
national sample.38  Respondents were read a description of a particular man, 
with information about his mental health status and homelessness being varied.  
They found that the label “homeless” resulted in significantly higher ratings for 
social distance and assessments of dangerousness.  They found no statistically 
 
 31. Id. at 419. 
 32. Pellegrini, supra note 20, at 1146. 
 33. Adrian Furnham, Why Are the Poor Always With Us?  Explanations for Poverty in 
Britain, 21 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 311 (1982). 
 34. Serge Guimond & Douglas L Palmer, Type Of Academic Training And Casual 
Attributions For Social Problems, 20 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 61 (1990). 
 35. Barrett A. Lee et al., Are the Homeless to Blame: A Test of Two Theories, 33 SOC. INQ. 
535, 541 (1992). 
 36. Toro & McDonell, supra note 27, at 73. 
 37. Pellegrini et al., supra note 20, at 1143. 
 38. Jo Phelan et al., The Stigma of Homelessness: The Impact of the Label “Homeless” on 
Attitudes Toward Poor Persons, 60 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 323 (1997). 
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significant variation in whether the man in the vignette was to blame for his 
situation.39 
Although we have vastly more information on attributions of homelessness 
than we did in 1991, there are still too many degrees of freedom in the research 
designs of the various studies, even when they are considered together, for us 
to be entirely certain of explanations.  First, there is some reason to believe that 
attitudes toward homelessness have changed over time, so that apparent 
contradictions between results of 1989 surveys and 1997 surveys may 
accurately reveal historical trends rather than conflicting evidence.  Second, 
lay people (like social scientists) do not have an easy time sorting out the 
multiple connections between homelessness and other phenomena: mental 
illness, welfare, poverty, alcoholism and substance abuse, and so on.  Forcing 
respondents to a choice between the social and the individual may suppress the 
complexity of real respondent beliefs.  Third, people respond differently to 
questions about the abstract category of “the homeless” than to vignettes about 
a particular homeless person described in some detail. 
Finally, as I explore in greater depth below, one cannot probe attitudes 
toward  “the homeless” or one hypothetical individual in the same way one can 
assess reactions to simple stimuli like colors or geometric shapes.  One of the 
findings of modern cognitive science is that our beliefs, categorizations, 
conceptual schemes, and so on are not well represented by set theory or other 
clean categorizations, even in seemingly simple cases.  Rather, such mental 
representations are more accurately represented as emergent properties of 
connectionist networks, in which many different things interact 
simultaneously.  Thus, the “vignette” study by Phelan et al. portrayed a 
hypothetical “Jim” in a text that highlighted numerous social categories in 
addition to homelessness.  “Jim” was described as having always been “a poor 
man having come from a large family that had to get along with a very small 
income” who “quit school before finishing high school in order to get a job at a 
fast food restaurant.”40  Contemporary theories of discourse comprehension41 
suggest that subjects could not thereafter disentangle all the other associations 
and images created by this text from whether “Jim” was homeless or poor but 
housed. 
Having raised these methodological quibbles, I want to set them aside for 
now.  I will assume for purposes of this essay that there is in fact a greater 
general tendency on the part of many Americans to attribute homelessness 
more than poverty to societal or structural causes, and to focus on three further 
 
 39. Id. at 331. 
 40. Id. at 329. 
 41. See, e.g., Walter Kintsch, The Role of Knowledge in Discourse Comprehension, 95 
PSYCHOL. REV. 163 (1987). See generally T. A. VAN DIJK & W. KINTSCH, STRATEGIES OF 
DISCOURSE COMPREHENSION (1983). 
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questions: Are these findings surprising?  What accounts for them—to what do 
we attribute these attributional beliefs?  Finally, does any of this matter to 
advocates? 
B. Reasons These Findings Are Surprising 
There are many reasons to be surprised by the greater causal attribution of 
homelessness to society.  First, as has been very well documented in many 
studies, if homelessness is seen as connected to poverty, the dominant 
ideological conception of poverty, especially in the United States, greatly 
prefers individualist explanations.42 
In addition to being poor, however, homeless people have several other 
features that should strengthen individualist explanations.  First, a distinct 
subset of the homeless individuals—those with evident mental disorders and 
substance abuse problems—are highly visible.  There are good reasons to think 
that people will generalize from these “available” instances to reach more 
general conclusions about homelessness in general.43  These most visible 
homeless individuals have problems that are generally seen as individual.  
Sophisticates might blame crack addiction on international economic forces in 
Latin America or alcoholism on advertising, but surely most people believe 
substance abuse is the consequence of personal choices.  Similarly, some 
people may attribute a publicly visible mental disorder to the lack of an 
adequate mental health care system, but most people must certainly see serious 
mental illness as a property of individuals, and not something caused by social 
forces.  For these reasons in 1994, I felt comfortable in assuming that the 
dominant ideology and concomitant individualist explanations for poverty 
would obtain with even greater force in the case of homelessness.44  But I was 
wrong. 
C. Some Possible Explanations 
In preparing this paper, I asked a number of colleagues and students how 
they might account for the disparity between attributions of causation for 
poverty and for homelessness, in effect conducting an informal survey of 
attributions of attribution.  I recount the more common explanations here. 
 
 42. See generally JOE R. FEAGIN, SUBORDINATING THE POOR (1975); Carr & MacLachlan, 
supra note 19, at 189; David J. Harper, Accounting for Poverty: From Attribution to Discourse, 6 
J. COMMUNITY & APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 249 (1996); Patrick C.L. Heaven, Economic Locus 
of Control Beliefs and Lay Attributions of Poverty, 41 AUSTL. J. PSYCHOL. 315 (1989); Janak 
Pandey et al., Right-left Political Ideologies and Attribution of the Causes of Poverty, 12 EUR. J. 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 327 (1982); Furnham, supra note 33, at 311. 
 43. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency 
and Probability, 5 COG. PSYCHOL. 207 (1973). 
 44. Gary Blasi, And We Are Not Seen: Ideological and Political Barriers to Understanding 
Homelessness, 37 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 563, 581 (1994). 
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First, it is possible that people develop causal theories by the 
commonsensical method of trying to place himself or herself in the situation of 
a prototypical poor or homeless person.  People may find it easy to imagine 
circumstances that might result in being poorer—preferring leisure to work, for 
example.  But if they can imagine no circumstance under which they would 
themselves make choices that would result in homelessness, then homelessness 
must be the product of something else.  The “something else” might well be a 
diffuse notion of  “structural” or “social” causation, as a general residual 
possibility rather than an articulated social theory. 
Second, as compared to poverty, homelessness is seen as a relatively recent 
phenomenon.  While the poor we may have always had with us, not until the 
early 1980’s was homelessness identified in the media and broader culture as a 
significant problem.  And then, it appeared as a “new” problem.  Indeed, the 
phrase “the new homeless” was contrived to describe a class of homeless 
persons whose demographics and life trajectories appeared significantly 
different from the “traditional homeless”—older men, typically alcoholics, 
concentrated in urban cores.45  The dominant ideology supplied individualist 
explanations for poverty, but the “new homeless” were not part of the social 
landscape already mapped by that ideology.  Again, in reaction, many people 
may have thought that something structural must have happened to account for 
the new phenomenon.  This need for a residual, and possibly structuralist, 
explanation increased the more the “new” homeless varied from the older 
stereotypes accommodated by the dominant ideology. 
A third explanation for the relative pervasiveness of structural explanations 
for homelessness is cultural and historical.  Although “the homeless” category 
in its current form is of fairly recent vintage, it did not arise in a culture in 
which forms of homelessness were completely alien.  The last period in 
American history when homelessness was so salient a feature of the culture 
was the Great Depression, which produced not only mass homelessness but 
also great literature about homelessness.  Christina Sheehan Gold argues that 
the novelist John Steinbeck and essayist Carey McWilliams produced works 
 
 45. The term “new homeless” was quickly adopted both by social scientists and the popular 
media.  See, e.g., Constance Holden, Homelessness: Experts Differ on Root Causes, 232 SCIENCE 
569 (1986); The Shanty Builders, PEOPLE, Feb. 17, 1986, at 94.  The latter article demonstrates in 
its opening paragraph how far the framing had gone in the popular (as in PEOPLE) literature: 
This is the final article in PEOPLE’s series on the homeless in America, who now number 
two million by some estimates. We have looked at the plight of 95 percent of these men 
and women—the “new homeless”—people suddenly out of work, out of housing they can 
afford or discharged from mental hospitals without a place to go.  This concluding story 
describes the life of more familiar figures, the country’s hoboes.  Ironically, although they 
make up only 5 percent of the homeless population nowadays, they remain the stereotype 
for all. 
Id. 
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during the Depression that facilitated “a permanent shift in many Americans’ 
conception of the homeless.”  The force of these cultural works, Gold argues, 
was such that “Many Americans, but by no means all, came to pity, rather than 
fear, the homeless.”46 
A fourth reason people may privilege structural explanations for 
homelessness relates to the connection, or lack thereof, between homelessness 
and welfare.  Of all the groups that have some potential relation to 
homelessness, Americans are most hostile toward welfare recipients.47  More 
than any other group, welfare recipients are seen as being responsible for their 
own plight.48  One simple explanation for this fact is the success of the 
ideologues and polemicists employed to disparage welfare recipients as a 
means of reducing transfer payments (and thereby taxation).  Although 
homeless people have more recently become the focus of animosity and 
disparagement, primarily as threats to decency and public order, there is a 
significant difference in the content of the attacks.  The fundamental difference 
between “the homeless” and “welfare recipients” is that “the homeless” are not 
(at least in any salient way) getting something for nothing, i.e., receiving 
benefits without working for them.  This diminishes the pragmatic reasons for 
the voices of the wealthy to attack them, and thereby both the volume and 
intensity of the propaganda directed toward them. 
The differences in attitudes toward the welfare poor and the homeless may 
also have far deeper, even evolutionary, roots.  A full exploration of this point 
is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is worth noting that careful 
experiments demonstrate that people have particularly acute cognitive abilities 
to detect “cheaters”—people who take but do not contribute.  Evolutionary 
psychologists suggest that this ability must necessarily have evolved during the 
vast reaches of human history when our ancestors lived in hunter-gatherer 
bands, as a defense to another tendency with great survival value—the ability 
to obtain the fruits (and nuts and game) of the labor of others.49 
All of these explanations have at least a superficial plausibility.  But there 
are two other explanations I want to explore in some depth, because they may 
have particular relevance to the work of advocates for homeless and poor 
people.  First, I will suggest that current attributions of the causes of 
homelessness may themselves be the product of past advocacy, much of which 
 
 46. See generally CHRISTINA SHEEHAN GOLD, THE CHANGING FACE OF HOMELESSNESS: 
JOHN STEINBECK & CAREY MCWILLIAMS (1998), abstract available at 
http://www.sjsu.edu/depts/ steinbec/abstract.html (Feb. 12, 2000). 
 47. MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE 28 (1999) (comparing attitudes 
regarding public spending for the unemployed, the poor, the elderly, welfare, and other social 
needs). 
 48. Id. at 32-39. 
 49. Leda Cosmides, The Logic of Social Exchange: Has Natural Selection Shaped How 
Humans Reason? Studies with the Wason Selection Task, 31 COGNITION 187 (1989). 
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tried very explicitly to locate the causes of homelessness in social structure and 
social policy.  Second, I will suggest that differential causal attributions for 
homelessness and poverty may also be the product of the interaction of a 
hidden, or at least unspoken, process: the differential racialization of 
homelessness and of poverty and welfare.  Put simply, attributional beliefs 
about the poor and about the homeless are mediated by both conscious 
assumptions about the racial composition of the two groups, and by 
unconscious processes, the power of which cognitive scientists have only 
recently begin to document.  Finally, of course, unlike the typical juror, we 
need not choose between narratives of causation.  For example, there is some 
evidence that the work of advocates had something to do with the differential 
racialization of “the homeless” as compared to “the poor.” 
IV. ADVOCACY AND THE SHAPING OF ATTRIBUTION:  DID HOMELESS 
ADVOCATES DO IT? 
One possible explanation for the attributions of causes of homelessness is 
that these pervasive public attitudes are the product of conscious advocacy, 
aided by the mass media, during the time that “the homeless” took shape in 
contemporary American popular culture.  Although homelessness may have 
long existed in many different forms in the United States, the modern 
construction of homelessness began in New York City and Washington, D.C. 
in late 1970’s and early 1980’s.  In Washington, D.C., Mitch Snyder, Mary 
Ellen Hombs and others at the Center for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) 
brought homelessness into public view with a series of brilliantly conceived 
acts of civil disobedience and public education.50  In New York City, 
consciousness of homelessness increased as the result of well-publicized 
litigation against the City of New York conducted by an advocacy group, the 
Coalition for the Homeless.  Sympathetic articles, first in the New York Times 
and then in other media, highlighted the seriousness of the problem and gave 
voice to one view of its causes. 
The National Coalition for the Homeless, of which Hayes was the best 
known spokesperson,51 produced studies, papers and polemics on the causes of 
homelessness.  Hayes, a brilliant lawyer and publicist, was frequently quoted 
as saying there were three reasons people were homeless: “housing, housing 
and housing.”52  Hayes would later write that, “[h] omelessness, of course, is 
 
 50. See, e.g., MARY ELLEN HOMBS & MITCH SNYDER, HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA: A 
FORCED MARCH TO NOWHERE (1982).  Victoria Rader has also written a sympathetic account of 
CCNV’s work in SIGNAL THROUGH THE FLAMES: MITCH SNYDER AND AMERICA’S HOMELESS 
(1986). 
 51. Candor requires the disclosure that I was then a member, and later President, of the 
Board of Directors of the National Coalition for the Homeless. 
 52. See, e.g., Homeless Ranks Swell, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 1987, at 10. 
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nothing more than the most radical symptom of everything else that has not 
worked, the most dire example of poverty caused by any number of things—
bad housing, bad education, bad industrial development and so on.”53 Although 
the “three things” that cause homelessness were no longer confined to housing, 
they remained at the societal or structural level. 
Other advocacy groups throughout the country were making the same 
causal arguments, often in less nuanced form than that just quoted.  The media 
was entirely receptive to these ideas.  Content analysis of articles on 
homelessness in five major newspapers between 1989 and 1993 is very 
revealing.54  Only 4% articles attributed individualistic causes to homelessness, 
compared to 63% of articles on welfare dependency.55  A sociologist friend 
once observed to me that polls and surveys are much like multiple choice 
examinations given to students: The media provide the instruction to the 
public, and surveys determines how well the lessons have been learned.  The 
plausibility of this explanation increases when one learns that even in New 
York City, where personal encounters with homeless people are frequent, most 
people state that they have relied on the media in forming their opinions about 
the homeless.56 
This framing of homelessness in structural terms by advocates and the 
media has been mentioned by several researchers on causal attribution.  Thus 
Lee et al. observe, “Unlike other contemporary forms of poverty, or even its 
own skid-row incarnation in the past, homelessness today has been “framed” 
as a structural phenomenon sufficiently often in the news and other “arenas of 
public discourse” to mute traditional beliefs about the individualistic roots of 
socioeconomic failure.”57  The reference to “arenas” comes from the “public 
arenas” theory of social problem construction.58 
The public arenas theory is sometimes juxtaposed against the theory that 
most people accept the causal attributions embedded in the “dominant 
ideology,” which serves to maintains stratification by attributing what might 
otherwise be seen as troubling inequalities to the deficiencies of those in the 
lower classes.59  By contrast, public arenas theory suggests that particular 
causal views emerge in the course of a contested public discourse, in which 
 
 53. Robert Hayes, Litigating on Behalf of Shelter for the Poor, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
79, 80 (1987). 
 54. George Wilson, Toward A Revised Framework For Examining Beliefs About The Causes 
Of Poverty, 37 SOC. Q. 413 (1996). 
 55. Id. at 425. 
 56. Annette Benedict et al., Attitudes Towards the Homeless in Two New York City 
Metropolitan Samples, 17 J. VOLUNTARY ACTION RES. 90, 92 (1998). 
 57. Lee et al., supra note 35, at 547. 
 58. Id.; Stephen Hilgartner & Charles L. Bosk, The Rise and Fall of Social Problems: A 
Public Arenas Model, 94 AM. J. SOC. 53 (1988). 
 59. Wilson, supra note 54, at 413. 
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various issues and conceptions of issues compete for public recognition as 
“problems.”  Wilson’s comparative study of attitudes toward the homeless, 
welfare recipients and migrant laborers tends to support the public arenas 
theory.60  The dominant ideology theory accounts less well for variations in 
attitudes toward the poor, as variously described and situated.  Further, the 
public arenas theory has perhaps great pragmatic utility, in suggesting ways in 
which dominant attributional schemes can be affected by conscious actors, 
including advocates.  Challenging the dominant ideology seems, almost by 
definition, an impossible task, short of major social upheaval. 
Ironically, the supposed contest between the dominant ideology and public 
arena theories replays at a new level of analysis a familiar discursive theme.  
Are the most important causes of homelessness structural or individual?  
Should attitudes toward the homeless be explained as the consequence of long 
term and large scale ideological dispositions toward the lower social strata or 
as the product of actions and choices of actors in arena of public discourse?  
One is reminded of the observation that there are only two kinds of people: 
those who classify people into two kinds and those who do not.  Plainly, just as 
the homelessness of any particular person or group can be fully accounted for 
only considering simultaneously the operation of historical/sociological forces 
and biographical/psychological factors, it seems unwise to fix too early on any 
single causal explanation of popular causal explanations for homelessness.  
While resisting the temptation ourselves, we might note in ourselves the 
seeming universality of poles of argument. 
Perhaps it is in the nature of ideologies (rather than social theories) to force 
causal attributions to one extreme or another.  The “dominant ideology” thesis 
suggests that the outcomes of these contests are preordained.  But the case of 
American homelessness suggests otherwise.  The relative “success” of 
structuralism in the case of homelessness can be gleaned by comparing two 
articles by the conservative scholar Thomas Main.  Writing in the neo-
conservative The Public Interest in 1983, Main criticized advocates and 
structuralists among the social sciences, concluding: 
For the fact of the matter is that the homeless, like the poor, we will always 
have with us.  The only question is how to help them without encouraging 
them in their pathologies and dependency.61 
A mere decade later, Main was writing fairly plaintively (if entirely 
reasonably) that, 
. . . no account of [the] problem can be entirely structural or entirely 
individualistic.  To see these accounts as polar opposites and then come down 
on one side or the other is to oversimplify.62 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Thomas J. Main, The Homeless of New York, 72 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 3, 28 (1986). 
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What the history of the homeless issue suggests for concerned citizens is that 
the dominant ideology, though powerful, has no inevitable grip on how the 
public will come to understand a social problem.  Within the dominant 
ideology, there may be ideological lacunae in which conscious citizens can act 
to some effect.  It may be that the dominant ideology operates less powerfully 
to constrain conceptualizations of poverty that do not fundamentally contest 
social inequality.  For one can, though perhaps not easily, subscribe 
simultaneously to the beliefs that (a) great inequality is both natural and 
efficient, and (b) that homelessness and utter destitution are neither inevitable 
nor desirable. 
Other legal scholars have noted that the strategic advocacy choices made 
by lawyers may have affected perceptions of homelessness beyond those of 
causal attribution.  Lucie White has suggested that the choice of advocates to 
focus on homelessness itself (rather than a “diverse and ugly” poverty) resulted 
in the proliferation of “simplistic, indeed invidious, images of the poor” that can 
be linked to “disturbing trends in housing and welfare policy.”63  Wes Daniels has 
argued that the particular characterizations given to homelessness by litigators 
gave rise to later judicial hostility toward the homeless.64  Daniels notes that the 
attributed causes of homelessness in judicial opinions have changed—from early 
cases about helpless “derelicts,”65 to later cases emphasizing “recurring 
misfortune”66 and “economic hard times”67 to the most recent cases—all of them 
lost by homeless litigants—that portray homelessness as a “lifestyle choice.”68  I 
fear, however, that Daniels may himself be making an attributional error here: 
Legal Realists would suggest that the political backgrounds and ideological 
dispositions of the judges in the cases Daniels discusses—the consequence of 
shifting political tides for which homeless advocates can probably not be 
blamed—fully accounts for the differences in causal attributions reflected in their 
opinions.  In any case, I do accept White’s point that emphasizing homelessness 
 
 62. Thomas J. Main, Analyzing Evidence for the Structural Theory of Homelessness, 18 J. 
URB. AFF. 449, 452 (1996). 
 63. Lucie White, Representing The Real Deal, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 271, 312 (1991) 
(arguing that “‘Homelessness’ is an intrinsically negative way to conceptualize shelter 
uncertainty.  It too easily suggests images of absence and depletion, of defeated human beings.”). 
 64. Wes Daniels, ‘Derelicts,’ Recurring Misfortune, Economic Hard Times and Lifestyle 
Choices: Judicial Images of Homeless Litigants and Implications for Legal Advocates, 45 BUFF. 
L. REV. 687 (1997). 
 65. Id. at 698. Notably the first “homeless case,” Callahan v. Carey No. 79-42582 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1979), in which, as Daniels notes, the trial court judge referred to those before him no 
less than 7 times in 900 words as “derelicts.” 
 66. Id. at 696 (citing Hodge v. Ginsberg, 303 S.E. 2d 245, 250 (W. Va. 1983)). 
 67. Id. (citing Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1564 (S.D. Fla. 1992)). 
 68. Id. (citing Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 389 (Ct. App. 1994)), rev’d, 
892 P.2d 1145 (Cal. 1995); Church v. City of Huntsville, No. CIV.A.No. 93-C-1239-S, 1993 WL 
646401, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 23, 1993), vacated and remanded, 30 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1994). 
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brings up unpalatable images of poverty and hence may result in less public 
support for the poor.  But I find implausible Daniels’ particular argument that by 
emphasizing external causes of homelessness and portraying homeless people as 
“unfortunate victims of forces beyond their control,” homelessness litigators 
adopted an approach that “carried the seeds of its own destruction,” leading to the 
more recent cases that assume or assert that homelessness is a matter of personal 
choice.69 
V. HOMELESSNESS, POVERTY, RACE AND WELFARE:  ATTRIBUTION THEORY 
AND AUTOMATIC BELIEFS 
Thus far our analyses and the various arguments discussed have effectively 
treated attributional beliefs as if they were simply beliefs about facts.  It is 
possible that beliefs about the causes of homelessness are similar in kind to 
beliefs about the causes of winter or sunspots.  If this is the case, then the job 
of advocacy is primarily education, the correction of mistaken empirical belief.  
As I explain in this section, however, such a perspective gives far too rational a 
gloss to attributional beliefs, and fails to take account of powerful and 
predictable, if irrational and unconscious, processes of social cognition. 
A. What We Think About When We Think About “The Homeless” 
Let me begin by turning back to the empirical studies and surveys already 
reported.  When we conduct surveys or experiments in which people respond 
in various ways to questions or vignettes containing words like “homeless,” are 
we really measuring in some way the responses to a fairly simple linguistic 
stimulus?  Although we are accustomed to making quite a lot of the 
distribution of answers we receive, we should perhaps be more cautious.  
Certainly, no trial lawyer would consider accepting at face value a prospective 
juror’s response to a single question like, “Do you believe homelessness is 
mainly the fault of individual homeless people or of society.”  A litigator 
would persist in a more extended interrogation, exploring any answer with 
more questions before being satisfied that she had obtained an accurate picture 
of a witness’ true beliefs about causation.  Such a procedure might elicit, for 
example, that on hearing the word “homelessness,” different people have quite 
different things come to mind, that people have quite different implicit 
assumptions about the age, family status, race, mental disability, and so on of 
people who are homeless.  Lay people and social scientists alike understand 
that etiologies of homelessness may vary across the different subgroups within 
“the homeless.”  Thus, answers regarding the causes of homelessness might 
reflect more about assumptions and beliefs about the composition of “the 
homeless” than about attributions of cause or implicit social theories. 
 
 69. Id. at 708. 
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B. Prototypes and Bad Information 
Some theories hold that we understand concepts or categories like “the 
homeless” with reference to a prototype or a set of exemplars, which define the  
“best example” of the category.70  The structure of these concepts can be 
probed by measuring how long it takes people to assign candidate objects to a 
category.  For example, for North Americans, the prototypical bird is a robin, 
the prototypical fruit a red apple.71  According to modern cognitive theory, 
when any of us thinks about the concept “homeless,” we also retrieve a 
prototype or set of exemplars.  Prototypes and exemplars have the same types 
of features, as do real-world instances of the category: gender, disposition, age, 
race, and so on.  If you are like most people, if I ask you to imagine a 
carpenter, and then ask you to imagine the color of her hair, two things will 
happen.  First, you may be a bit surprised when you encounter the pronoun 
“her” in the previous sentence, and then you will likely respond with “brown.” 
Something similar probably happened when you read about a hypothetical, 
apparently homeless person named Kim, pushing a shopping cart near the 
beginning of this essay.  If you are like most people, you assumed Kim was a 
woman, of early middle age, and that she was in fact homeless.  You probably 
did that because of (1) your experience as to the gender of persons named Kim 
—which might not include Kim Hopper, a noted scholar (male) on the subject 
of homelessness, (2) your assumptions about the gender and apparent age of 
seemingly homeless persons who push shopping carts, and (3) your assumption 
about the living arrangements of persons who “appear” to be homeless.  What 
we think about social categories as well as hypothetical individuals is affected 
by our reactions to what we take to be prototypical features of those in the 
category.  If our prototype of “the homeless” is male and black, our reactions 
will be affected by what we think, both consciously and unconsciously, about 
men, African Americans, or African American men.72 
C. Prototypes and Attribution 
There are a couple of additional significant experimental findings worth 
noting about prototypes and attributional belief.  First, people tend to see “out-
groups”—groups to which one does not belong and with which one does not 
 
 70. There is some controversy about whether categories are represented by prototypes, by 
sets of exemplars, or whether in fact such an account of categories can fully account for all the 
kinds of categories people use.  See, e.g., Brian H. Ross & Valerie S. Makin, Prototype Versus 
Exemplar Models in Cognition, in THE NATURE OF COGNITION 205-241 (1999). 
 71. Edward E. Smith, Categorization, in THINKING: AN INVITATION TO COGNITIVE SCIENCE 
44-46 (Daniel N. Osherson & Edward E. Smith eds., 1991). 
 72. Eliot R. Smith & Michael A. Zarate, Exemplar-Based Model of Social Judgment, 99 
PSYCHOL. REV. 3 (1992). 
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identify—as more homogeneous than “in-groups.”73  This “out-group 
homogeneity effect” is related to the perceived “entitativity” of the group—the 
degree to which the category of persons is perceived as a single entity.  
Members of “out-groups” are also more likely to be represented by singular 
prototypes than members of  “in-groups.”74  The more entitative a group—the 
better represented by a singular prototype—the more we attribute individual 
behaviors and situations to individual dispositions rather than situational 
factors.75  Given the seemingly greater social distance survey respondents feel 
toward “the homeless” (compared to the merely poor), these phenomenon 
should result in more individualist accounts of the causes of homelessness.  
Moreover, the processes of social discourse that have transformed a more 
undifferentiated group into “the homeless” would have amplified these 
effects.76  This might be the case, but for other powerful countervailing forces, 
described below. 
D. Associations and Automaticity 
In order to get to the main point of this section, I need to explain a bit more 
about recent findings about the architecture of human cognition.  Classic 
studies in cognitive science suggest that, unlike digital computers, human 
beings do not store information in neatly labeled memory registers, but rather 
in the connections within immensely complex associative networks.77  These 
theories suggest, for example, that I can influence how you will respond to a 
stimulus like “Name an Ivy League university” merely by exposing you to 
objects colored pale blue or crimson red.  We would expect, then, that asking 
someone about “the homeless” or a person described as homeless will also 
activate concepts, words or images associated with the word  “homeless” in 
semantic memory.  Our reactions—both attitudes and behavior—will be 
affected not merely by the stimulus word or concept, but also by the entire web 
of associated concepts. 
 
 73. David L. Hamilton & Steven J. Sherman, Perceiving Persons and Groups, 103 
PSYCHOL. REV. 336, 349 (1996). 
 74. Id. (citing M.B. Brewer & A.S. Harasty, Seeing Groups as Entities: The Role of 
Perceiver Motivation, in 3 HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION AND COGNITION: THE INTERPERSONAL 
CONTEXT (R. Sorrentino & E.T. Higgins eds., 1996)). 
 75. Vincent Y. Yzerbyt et al., Group Entitativity and Social Attribution: On Translating 
Situational Constraints into Stereotypes, 24 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1089 (1998). 
 76. There is sometimes significant evidence of social categorization and entitativity in the 
language people use.  I do not recall the first time I ever read or heard the term, “the homeless,” 
but I recall an immediate sense of unease, one more easily explained to others, perhaps, by 
analogy to terms like “the Irish,” or “the Jews.” 
 77. An early example is A.M. Collins & E.F. Loftus, A Spreading-activation Theory of 
Semantic Processing, 82 PSYCHOL. REV. 407 (1975).  This “connectionist” paradigm is now 
pervasive throughout cognitive science, including social psychology. 
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Some recent experiments are highly suggestive of the power of these 
associational networks for affecting both beliefs and behavior.  Consider for a 
moment the concept and category “elderly.”  The “elderly” stereotype is 
associated with many qualities, some of them unique to individuals but many 
of them common throughout a culture.  Experimental subjects in one study 
were asked to solve “scrambled sentence” puzzles involving large numbers of 
words, a few of which were associated with the “elderly” stereotype, including: 
“worried,” “Florida,” “lonely,” “wise,” “bingo,” etc.” Another feature of the 
“elderly” stereotype not mentioned in any of the words in the puzzles is 
slowness of gait.  Nevertheless, when subjects left the experiment room, those 
who had merely unscrambled sentences containing words like “worried,” 
“Florida,” “lonely,” “wise,” “bingo,” walked substantially more slowly down 
the hall toward the elevator.78  Merely activating the web of associations 
connected with “elderly” had produced a dramatic behavioral result. 
In a similar experiment in the same study, subjects were asked to perform a 
tedious, demanding computer task.  During the computer work, pictures of 
Caucasian and African American men were flashed on the computer screen for 
a few thousandths of a second, well below the level of conscious perception.  
Then, after 130 tedious entries, the computer flashed an error message: “All 
data lost—please begin again.”  A video camera mounted above the screen 
captured the facial expressions of the experimental subjects, which were then 
independently rated as to the anger they displayed.  Remarkably, those subjects 
who had merely been exposed to subliminal pictures of African American men 
exhibited substantially more anger than subjects who had been exposed either 
to no pictures or pictures of white men.  Psychologists describe these processes 
as “automatic” because they operate entirely below the level of consciousness: 
subjects in both experiments reported no awareness of having seen the stimuli, 
the “elderly” words or the flashed face pictures.  In effect, the subjects’ 
associational networks had demonstrably controlled behavior and emotion 
directly, without conscious processing by the subjects.  Plainly, then, when we 
ask survey respondents about “the homeless” or any other social category, any 
response will be affected by the entire web of related associations.  Further, the 
content of those associations seems to play out at a subconscious level, beneath 
the level we commonly think of as holding our beliefs about facts and 
causation. 
E. Homelessness, Poverty, Welfare and Race 
What, then, are the associational networks in which “homeless” and “poor” 
are embedded?  The networks of individuals vary some, of course.  For 
example, for some social scientists, but few lay people, the term “homeless” 
 
 78. John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct 
and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 230 (1996). 
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may activate “disaffiliation.”  Without doing experiments, we cannot describe 
the semantic networks in which the notion “homeless” is embedded for most 
people.  But I would hypothesize that among the ideas activated in American 
minds by sentences containing the word  “homeless” are the following (in no 
particular order): poverty, mental disorder, drug addiction, welfare, alcoholism, 
begging, racial minority, public disorder, and so on.  Of course, the strength of 
the associations will vary, and the associated concepts are themselves also all 
interconnected.  The concepts “poor” and “welfare” will activate different, 
albeit not completely dissimilar, associational networks.  Might the differences 
in those associations account for differences in observed attributional belief? 
In particular, we know that Americans’ perceptions and prejudices about 
welfare; race and poverty are deeply intertwined.79  In the United States, the 
hostility toward welfare is thoroughly racialized.  Despite the empirical data to 
the contrary, welfare is seen as mainly benefiting African Americans.80  Belief 
that most people on welfare are African American correlates strongly with the 
belief that welfare recipients’ circumstances are due to “a lack of effort on their 
own part.”81 
In the case of “the homeless,” popular stereotypes significantly understate 
the prevalence of African Americans among the homeless.  In fact, African 
Americans are far more likely to be homeless than other groups.82  But surveys 
of beliefs about the racial composition of “the homeless” consistently 
underestimate the proportion of African Americans, as compared to the best 
local data.  For example, respondents in Erie County, New York 
underestimated the percentage of African Americans among the local homeless 
population by 18%.83  In a national survey by the Gallup Organization, a 
quarter of respondents were unsure whether the “average homeless person” 
was white or nonwhite; and of those with an opinion, most (54%) believed that 
the average homeless person was white.84 
These beliefs about the demography of homelessness strongly affect what 
people think about “the homeless.”  A national survey examining the relation 
 
 79. For an excellent study of the development of welfare policy and the complexity of 
attitudes toward welfare, see JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF POVERTY: WELFARE REFORM IN AMERICA (1991). 
 80. GILENS, supra note 47. 
 81. Id. at 140. 
 82. Kim Hopper & Norweeta G. Milburn, Homelessness Among African Americans: A 
Historical and Contemporary Perspective, in HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA 123 (Jim Baumohl 
ed., 1996) (summarizing more than 60 studies finding that African Americans comprise an 
average of 39-44% of the homeless population in the samples studied); Susan Gonzalez Baker, 
Homelessness and the Latino Paradox, in HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA 133 (Jim Baumohl ed., 
1996) (comparing the racial/ethnic composition of samples of homeless people in 24 studies 
conducted in 18 U.S. cities to the general population data for the same metropolitan areas). 
 83. Toro & McDonell, supra note 27, at 64. 
 84. GALLUP ORGANIZATION, supra note 29, at 26. 
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between subjective estimates of the proportion of African Americans among 
the homeless and the application of racial stereotypes to the homeless found 
what we might expect: the higher the estimate, the more racial stereotypes 
were applied to the homeless.85  And, in a direct test of the racialization 
hypothesis, George Wilson used regression techniques to measure the 
connection between the perceived racial composition of “the homeless” and 
perceived causes of homelessness.  He found very strong evidence among his 
Baltimore respondents that attributional beliefs derived from perceptions of the 
racial composition of the groups identified in his survey (welfare recipients, 
homeless persons, and migrant laborers).86  Wilson summarizes his findings on 
this issue as follows: 
[P]erceptions that African Americans constitute the welfare dependent 
population is a powerful predictor of individualistic beliefs about the causes of 
welfare dependency, while perceptions that the homeless are white strongly 
influence the adoption of structural beliefs about their economic plight.87 
There are at least two ways to make sense of these data.  First, it may be 
that people apply a kind of logical syllogism to their racist stereotypes.  If one 
believes that African Americans are generally individually responsible for their 
circumstances (owing to out-group effects or simple prejudice), and one 
believes that most homeless people are African American, then simple logic 
compels a particular attributional belief, albeit one deriving from false  
premises.  But the cognitive science literature on the associational and often 
automatic character of attitude formation suggests a process other than simple 
deduction. 
Consider the formation of an attributional belief of a another kind: You 
observe two people you do not know engaged in an energetic conversation, the 
 
 85. Arthur Whaley & Bruce G. Link, Racial Categorization and Stereotype-based 
Judgments About Homeless People, 28 J. APP. SOC. PSYCHOL. 189 (1998).  The study by Whaley 
and Link, using national sample survey data, examined the relationship between estimates of the 
proportion of different racial groups among the homeless population and beliefs about homeless 
people, including their perceived dangerousness and the degree to which 
“laziness/irresponsibility” is a cause of homelessness.  Their data and regression analyses are hard 
to interpret because of the research design.  On the one hand, they find that subjective estimates 
of the percentage of African Americans in the homeless population correlates with the perceived 
dangerousness of homeless people.  Id. at 197.  But they find that a positive correlation between 
subjective estimates of the percentage of African Americans and belief that 
laziness/irresponsibility causes homelessness disappears when they control for “other 
psychological variables.”  One of those “other psychological variables” is the “extent to which 
respondents believe that homelessness is caused by structural factors.”  Id. at 194.  Since 
structural attributions and attributing homelessness to laziness or irresponsibility are, almost by 
definition, highly inter-correlated, it is difficult to interpret regression equations in which they are 
on either side of the equation. 
 86. Wilson, supra note 54, at 421. 
 87. Id. at 423. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
230 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:207 
contents of which you cannot hear.  Suddenly, one of them pushes the other.  A 
classic study finds that precisely the same “push” is interpreted differently: the 
“push” of a white person is seen as a jovial shove, while that of a black person 
is perceived as a “violent push.”88  Thagard and Kunda interpret these findings 
as the consequence of the differential activation of a network of associated 
concepts, as indicated in Figure I: 
FIGURE I89 

















Within cognitive scientific theory, the power of such network models is that 
the complex interaction of many different factors, acting simultaneously can be 
simulated on computers and the results predicted.  An exposition in that form 
is not feasible here.  The prose explanation of the mathematical model that 
simulates these results is, however, as follows: 
When one observes that a person pushed someone, pushed someone activates 
both violent push and jovial shove.  If one also observes that the pusher is 
Black, at the same time, Black activates aggressive, which further activates 
 
 88. H.A. Sagar & J.W. Schofield, Racial and Behavior Cues in Black and White Children’s 
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violent push while deactivating jovial shove.  If, on the other hand, one 
observes that the pusher is White, White does not activate aggressive.  
Therefore, both aggressive and violent push end up with less activation when 
the pusher is White than when the pusher is Black.  In this matter, stereotypes 
color (sic) one’s understanding of a person’s behavior and one’s impression of 
that person.90 
Notably, such models of social cognition do not assume that the associations 
come in the form of conscious, propositional beliefs about empirical facts.  
Subjects may not consciously adhere to propositions like, “African American 
men tend to be more aggressive than white men.”  Indeed, the research on 
automaticity of beliefs described above suggests that subjects may truthfully 
deny any such subjective belief, and still exhibit the same differences in the 
attribution of the ambiguous event. 
To extend these ideas to the subject at hand, we can hypothesize the 
simultaneous interaction of related concepts and stereotypic beliefs in the 
model depicted in Figure II: 
FIGURE II91 






 90. Thagard & Kunda, Making Sense of People, supra note 88, at 8. 
 91. Solid lines indicate positive or excitatory links: thicker lines indicate stronger links.  
Broken lines indicate negative or inhibitory links.  This graph is for illustration purposes only.  It 
does not reflect a formal model that has been tested, although it sufficiently simple that its 
behavior can be predicted by inspection.  At the moment, this model of the role of race and 
welfare in attributional beliefs about poverty and homelessness is merely empirically plausible, 
based on a compilation of different existing studies.  It would be possible to test the model more 
directly, by vignette studies in which subjects respond to hypothetical situations in which the 
characteristics of the fictional protagonist vary. 
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In prose form: poor activate both Black and welfare, which in turn activate 
individual attributions.  But homeless activates Black far less, and probably 
inhibits welfare (most people believing—incorrectly—that welfare recipients 
can always avoid homelessness), thereby activating individualist attributions 
less and structural problems more. 
In sum, observed differences between causal attributions of homelessness 
and of poverty may be entirely, as they seem.  These differences may be 
traceable to the work of advocates and the operation of the mass media in the 
early 1980’s.  It is also possible, however, that these differences are not 
entirely as they seem, and that most of the differences in how the causes of 
homelessness and poverty are perceived are accounted for by differences in the 
assumed racial composition of the categories activated in survey questions 
about “homelessness” or “poverty.”  Like most important questions, an answer 
requires empirical investigation.  No doubt there is some connection between 
differential racialization of the two categories; an equally important question 
is: how much?  I hope in future work to begin to answer this question, using 
vignette studies in which the race, poverty, and homeless status of the 
characters in the vignettes are systematically varied and controlled. 
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR ADVOCATES 
Near the end of any article written in part for practicing lawyers and other 
pragmatists, both author and reader come to the inevitable question: “So 
what?”  What implications are there for the ways in which lawyers and other 
advocates go about their work?  The following are four implications I take 
from the evidence already discussed and contemporary attribution theory. 
A. Effective Advocacy and Attribution 
Every skilled lawyer already knows that advocacy is aimed at audiences, 
and that one must know something about how each audience thinks the world 
works, whether in order to craft an opening statement or to design an entire 
advocacy campaign.  The decisions of jurors and of policy makers are the 
product both of preexisting beliefs and of the information and reframings that 
advocates bring to them.  No careful lawyer would consider how to present a 
case without taking into account those preexisting beliefs, particularly as to the 
crucial dimension of causation. 
Most lawyers think they know what those preexisting beliefs are, based on 
their common experience and intuition.  In this respect, lawyers are often 
wrong—as I was in 1994 in assuming that individualist attributions regarding 
poverty would carry over to homelessness.92  But lawyers can learn about the 
 
 92. Blasi, supra note 44, at 41. 
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actual contours of preexisting attributions and attitudes.  In the case of 
homelessness, for example, we now have a rich literature on the topic 
produced by skilled and sophisticated scholars, much of it referenced here.  
Where the empirical evidence has not already been gathered, advocates can 
work with social scientists to collect and analyze it.  Not to do so is akin to 
trying a case to a jury, having waived voir dire. 
B. Shaping Attributions 
I do not claim to have proven beyond doubt that the work of homeless 
advocates is responsible for current popular understandings of the causes of 
homelessness.  But it does seem plausible that advocates at least contributed to 
the ways in which homelessness and its causes came to be understood by the 
general public, particularly during the period in which homelessness took 
shape as a social problem.  It also seems plausible that the resulting 
configuration of common beliefs about homelessness has persisted in the 
culture, long after the initial shaping took place in public discourse.  There is 
evidence from other sources that attributional beliefs about social problems 
that sometimes crystallize during periods of intense interest can live on for 
decades.  For example, Lawrence Friedman has described how Progressive 
reformers in New York shaped perceptions of the causes of slum housing into 
the “persistent model of the evil slumlord.”93  In my experience those 
attributional beliefs continue quite strongly a century later in the causal 
understandings of other reformers in Los Angeles.94  Advocates, therefore, 
have perhaps both more opportunities and greater responsibilities than they can 
now fully appreciate. 
C. Opportunity and Opportunism 
That advocates can take account of attributional beliefs, and sometimes 
even shape them, suggests both opportunity and considerable risk.  Sometimes 
the seemingly easiest path leads into the quagmire.  A colleague in the 
National Coalition for the Homeless, tiring of the effort to “re-present” 
homeless people in an appealing light to reporters, once suggested that perhaps 
we should focus attention on “homeless blonde white girls with AIDS who are 
 
 93. LAWRENCE M. FREIDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING: A CENTURY OF 
FRUSTRATION 42 (1968). Friedman writes, “It was convenient . . . to assume that landlords were a 
class of evil men, overcharging ignorant tenants and callous to the point of criminality.” Id. at 40. 
 94. Since 1996, I have served as research director, and later member, of a Los Angeles 
Citizens’ Blue Ribbon Committee on Slum Housing, whose work resulted in substantial reforms 
in the way slum housing is regulated in Los Angeles.  Hector Tobar, Council OKs Apartment 
Inspection Reform Plan, LOS ANGELES TIMES, July 1, 1998, B-1.  Although my students and I 
presented as full an account as we could of all the factors contributing to the increase in slum 
housing, members of the Committee—all sophisticated lawyers, landlords, tenant activists and 
political figures—quickly gravitated toward a law enforcement focus aimed at “slumlords.” 
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Vietnam veterans.”  The point is that it is important for advocates not to fool 
themselves into believing that they have achieved real support for policies to 
help homeless people when those supporting those policies have quite another 
version of “the homeless” in mind.  For support can dwindle, as Martha Burt 
has written, “when middle-class Americans come face to face with the facts,”95 
or at least, a different version of the facts than they have hitherto believed.  
Indeed, one could combine the accounts in Sections IV and V above to argue 
that to the degree that homeless advocates altered attributional beliefs about 
homelessness, they may have done so in part by downplaying the great 
overrepresentation of African Americans in the homeless population.96  This 
has likely had consequences for public discourse about both race and civil 
rights that advocates never took into account.  Hence, the greater responsibility 
that comes with greater knowledge. 
D. Islands of Advocacy:  Whatever Happened to “The Movement”? 
Which brings me to the last lesson I take from the evidence and history 
recounted here.  In recent times, reformers and advocates have tended to work 
on fairly narrowly construed issues.  Indeed, even within homeless advocacy, 
most advocates now conceive themselves as advocates for subgroups: 
homeless families, veterans, the chronically mentally ill, and so on.  Among 
reformers generally, Balkanization—or at least a fairly fine division of political 
labor by issues and groups—is seemingly universal.  Advocates tend to 
specialize: on race discrimination and affirmative action, gender equity, low 
wage work, welfare reform, child care, housing, education, trade globalization, 
and so on.  In truth, there may never have been a time when advocacy was 
conceived differently, when social advocacy tended to link issues rather than to 
distinguish them ever more finely.  The cultural mythology of progressives 
locates such episodes in the Progressive era, in the 1930’s and again in the 
1960’s, but an empirical assessment of the myth is well beyond my scope here.  
On the other hand, advocacy on behalf of homeless people has always had 
significant potential—sometimes fulfilled—for bringing together people whose 
initial interests were more narrowly focused on housing issues, welfare, 
education, and so on.  But most advocacy work remains more narrowly 
focused and rarely framed in a way that enables those most concerned about 
housing or AIDS or mental health or welfare reform to understand their daily 
work as part of a common, and greater, enterprise. 
It should also be clear by now that homelessness is not a social problem 
that can be either understood or ameliorated without attending more directly to 
a range of other problems.  In particular, it is clear that we cannot deal with 
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homelessness in the twenty-first century without trying as hard as we can to 
solve what  W.E.B. Dubois characterized as “The problem of the twentieth 
century . . . the problem of the color line.”97 
The problem of homelessness is the problem of civil rights, as that concept 
was itself initially constructed in the century just ended, and not merely as a 
right to be let alone, free of police harassment.  And, of course, homelessness 
is many other problems as well.  And none of those problems can be 
understood or solved in isolation either.  We may not have a grand theory of 
everything, as Marxism was once misunderstood to be.  But neither we can 
merely tend our separate gardens of concern.  By their very existence on the 
streets of America, and increasingly on the streets of other advanced countries 
as well, homeless people continue to silently signal that all is not well.  How 
we collectively understand and respond—and whether we can respond 
collectively at all—will continue to define this generation of advocates and the 
next. 
 
 97. See generally W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 1903. 
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